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BOOK REVIEWS
An Introduction to the Sociology of Law. By N. S. Timasheff.* Cambridge: Harvard University Committee on Research in the Social
Sciences. 1939. Pp. xiv, 418. $4.00.
A horse race could 'be described in terms of several organized masses
of matter composed largely of carbon, oxygen, and hydrogen moving
simultaneously in the direction of a fixed line at varying velocities.
This may be a perfectly true account of the race. Or we could speak
of beautiful animals straining every fiber of their mighty bodies as their
own magnificent wills drive them toward the goal. This also may be a
perfectly true account of the race. Scientists and scholars may examine
some familiar subject like morality, law, or religion and their account
may vary greatly from the familiar realities as seen in the light of
ordinary experience. This does not mean that one account is true and
the other false. It merely means that reality is a combination of what
is examined and the mind which examines. Otherwise put, reality will
yield different impressions from different viewpoints. Dr. Timasheff's
book is a scholarly account of law as a force in social life. His account
is likely to prove more than a little bewildering to lawyers and law students unseasoned in such studies. It must be borne in mind that he is
dealing with matters familiar to lawyers, from a point of view not so
familiar, namely that of social science.
Although obviously a Russian, the author has become a master of
that complicated English with which American social scientists elevate
into the realm of science even their simplest statements about ordinary
matters. In order that this review may make sense to lawyers, the
ideas of the author will be presented in nontechnical language. If in
the process any meaning is lost, my apologies to the author.
Dr. Timasheff first marks off a field for sociology of law, and distinguishes it from jurisprudence in general, and from sociological jurisprudence. Jurisprudence, to Timasheff, is a study of legal rules, principles, and standards. that is, of the content of law (p. 24). Sociological jurisprudence is still a study of legal rules, principles, and standards,
but with emphasis on the social purpose of each (p. 28). Sociology of
law, on the other hand, is the study of law as a social force. It is not
concerned with what the law is on any subject, or what the social pur*This book is founded on lectures on sociological jurisprudence given by the
author at the Polytechnical Institute in Petrograd just prior to 1920, supplemented
by studies at Harvard since 1936. Dr. Timasheff has background and training in
the legal and social sciences in Russia, Germany, France, and the United States.
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pose of any rule is; but rather, with how law as a whole operates as a
force in society.
The central idea in the book is that any rule of conduct is law if,
and only if, it is supported both by the ethical- conviction of the social
group and by the power center in the group. The author elaborates
at length this idea that sociologically law is the overlapping of ethics
and power. He expounds the nature of ethical forces, divided into social
custom, morals, and law; also the nature of power as it is centered in
those who dominate the group. Law stripped of ethical group conviction is merely arbitrary decree; stripped of the support of the power
center it is mere custom or morals. Having established the nature of
law, Dr. Timasheff applies his analysis in the discussion of such matters as changes in law as it grows from primitive to modern form, the
integration of law in culture, and the like. A particularly apt application of his analysis is to be found in his account of the nature of international law (pp. 260-262). The books ends with a chapter on the
vindication of law, in which law is contrasted with no law. that is, with
anarchy. Having explained law in the light of the forces which produce it, Dr. Timasheff has prepared the ground for the principal objection to anarchy, namely, that there is no such animal. Forces working
in groups of human beings as they are produce law, not anarchy; if
we conceivably could establish an anarchistic social group, these forces
would begin producing law in it.
This book among its own kind is excellent. It is sure to be read
with profit by scholars. The auth6r has organized into his views a vast
amount of learning. His acquaintance with the work of other scholars
in related fields is prodigious. The book contains no more inaccuracies
than are usual and to be expected in a single volume covering a field
so large and knowledge "so great.' The author has proved himself
capable of clear and penetrating observation. Note this pungent sentence (p. 155): "The institution of money, with all its ramifications
(credit, stock exchange, et cetera), forms a curious adaptation of the
mentality needed for games to more serious purposes." The author
frequently refuses to be fooled by the complicated thought systems of
' For sample inaccuracies the following may serve. Speaking of ethical rules

the author says (p. 88), ". . . when one is taught by experience that a rule one
recognizes is not carried out or is no longer carried out by others, one gradually
loses the impulse to act in accordance with it oneself. Obviously it could not be
otherwise." (Italics mine.) Beyond question the author's generalization holds
true in most instances, but when he states that it could not be otherwise, he shows
that he has yet to become acquainted with a genuinely moral man. For example.
the more people lie, the more resolutely a few people adhere to the rule of
meticulous truthfulness out of repulsion to liars and lying, and out of their own
love for truth. A more obvious inaccuracy is to be found in the statement (p. 90),
"Lawyers and students of law are supposed to know the totality of legal rules. ..
The author did not appear to be joking!
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his fellow scholars; many times he keenly criticises their views. At
other times he appears to be completely taken in. For example he
quotes with approval (p. 146), "'It is more likely ... that conscience

is the reflection of public opinion rather than public opinion the reflection of conscience' (Ross, 64). 'Conscience is an inner mirror of
public opinion, an anticipated feeling of what would be the experience
if secret sins were made public.'" Oversimplifications such as this
bring scholarly theories under deserved suspicion. Into the compound
called a man's conscience has gone much that this theory leaves out.
Included are religious faith, a feeling of the grief which a wrong may
cause someone else, and the like. The reviewer is of the opinion that
into the compound has probably gone a man's whole life. (Perhaps if
the reviewer were a social scientist he could dress this idea in a few
hundred pages of abstruse English and thus gain credit for a tremendous discovery. But it may be that somebody else has already done
the job, and accordingly he has received the credit for discoveringwhat we knew before.)
The reviewer- notes that Dr. Timasheff repeats as fact (p. 36) the
latest guess of the psychologists as to the mechanics of thought. At
least I suppose it is the latest guess; it is not a very convincing one,
and will no doubt presently be superseded. This business of setting
out guesses as facts is a practice much too common in academic circles.
Should lawyers and law students read this book? To answer that
question, the general scheme of the book should be explained. The
scheme is one in common use by scholars in many fields. The scholar
examines some subject, like law, which is the sum of innumerable
events, experiences, and ideas, almost as varied as life itself. He gathers together a considerable number of related events, rules, or other
data, and makes a generalized statement, or abstraction, covering them
all. Other data are covered by other abstractions. When he comes to
write his book, he is likely to talk, not about the familiar events or
rules, but about the abstractions. The game is to build out of the abstractions some thought structure, some mental house made of the
abstractions. This urge in scholars to take some infinitely varied aspect
of life, and organize the whole subject by some scheme of abstractions
painstakingly fitted together results in books such as the one under
revie-v. Inherent in the process are a number of vices.
First, the ideas are abstract and complicated.
Second, a good deal of space is likely to be spent disputing with
other scholars as to the most ideal abstractions to cover the known facts.
For example (p. 136), the author raises the disputes as to whether
religion is a species of ethics, and whether a separate category called
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custom exists. Such disputes are important to scholars, but interest
of laymen when confronted with these matters is likely to flag.
Further, when a scholar has built a house of abstractions to organize
knowledge in a particular field, it often proves that simple and well
understood facts do not fit into the house of abstractions without a good
deal of intellectual pinching and squeezing. For example, Timasheff
says (p. 330): "From the individual's viewpoint, the most general
function of law is the redistribution of forces within society." This
abstraction fits such laws as minimum wage statutes or burglary statutes. But the law requiring traffic to keep to the right on highways
redistributes no force, at least, not Without a good deal of squeezing to
make the substance fit the generalization. From the individual's viewpoint the function of this law is to enable him to use the highway
without colliding with the other users. True, if he does collide with
a husky truck driver who is on the wrong side of the road the law may
aid him to collect damages instead of a black eye, and thus redistribute
force between them. But this is not the principal function of the law;
the principal function to the individual is to enable him to use the highways successfully. So also to the individual the principal function of
real estate recordation statutes is to enable him to engage in real estate
transactions safely.
Another drawback to this kind of book is that scholars dealing with
abstract and complicated ideas tend toward the use of abstract and
complicated English. This is natural, but unfortunate. The more
complex the idea the greater the necessity for expressing it simply and
plainly. Quite the reverse appears in Dr. Timasheff's book; in place
of complex ideas put in simple English, simple ideas are put in complex English. Witness this statement (p. 5) :
"The conclusion is: the normal motivation by law is in force with
regard to almost the totality-of citizens in the large majority of lifesituations in which the transgression of law is practically possible and
would correspond to the resultant of natural (i.e., of nonsocialized)
drives."
Can it be that the author simply means that almost everyone usually
obeys the law even where he would like to and could violate the law?
Note, in the author's sentence, the jargon which so appeals to social
scientists. Are citizens likely to find themselves in situations which
are not "life-situations"? Why not just say "situations", and be done
with it? Is there any difference between "the totality of citizens" and
just plain "all citizens"?
The author says (p. 87), in speaking of recognition of ethical rules,
"Recognition, insofar as it is directed toward one's own behavior, is

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 18

not so much the ethical 'profession' of an individual (verbal statements
of his principles of conduct), as his actual ethical attitude, i.e., his
readiness to act in accordance with certain ethical rules. Discrepancies
between these two are not at all rare." One has to look twice to see
in this splendid verbal dress the homely old truth that a man's ethics
are to be found in what he does, not what he says. At another point
(p. 96) the author takes half a page to say what a man on the street
would say in this terse sentence, "We don't like to see a man do wrong
2
and get away with it."
These criticisms do not mean that this book is inferior. On the
contrary, as said before, this book is an excellent one of its type. The
criticisms are leveled at the type. They would be true of most of the
books on jurisprudence the reviewer has read, even some of the most
famous of such books. The reviewer believes that study of the law as
a system should be undertaken by every law student. Many now learn
laws, but learn very little about law. But if a student or lawyer begins
his study of law as a social institution with a book like Dr. Timasheff's.
his interest in a subject which can be made fascinating is likely to be
killed. The book is simply too heavy going. A taste for this sort of
reading must be acquired. Dr. Timasheff's book is no place to begin.
FRANK W. HANFT.
Chapel Hill, N. C.
Practicing Law. By Silvester E. Quindry. Washington: Washington
Law Book Co. 1939. Pp. vii, 567. $3.75.
The title reveals the mission and substance of this book. The
author, with thirty years experience in the practice of law, attempts
to point out those details of a legal career which will aid embryonic
lawyers.
Although set up in acceptable hornbook fashion, with chapters
broken up into innumerable sub-topical sections, the book is not strictly
a legal publication. It is written in a popular style, more appealing to
laymen seeking an orthodox picture of lawyers and law practice. Its
treatment of important problems in the modern legal field is narrow
and superficial. The chapter on specialization could be expanded into
an entire volume; and undoubtedly such an effort would prove extremely valuable to both student and practitioner, affording guidance
where most needed, since the problem of specialization has to be resolved by an ever increasing number of the legal profession. It would
I It would be ungenerous to make this criticism if the style of the book were

traceable to the fact that the author is a foreigner, unfamiliar with our language.
This is far from true; the author's command of English, on the contrary, is likely
to outrun that of many native born readers.
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be unfair, however, to criticize the book's treatment of such problems
without acknowledging that "general observations must suffice" (p.
140) is the key to the author's approach. This is not a master key
for the entire book, however, for the author discusses in detail many
unimportant ABC's of practice which should prove boring to the intelligent reader. The subject of how to secure a competent secretary
(p. 516) occupies just as much space as the subject of contingent fees
(p. 421); yet, the importance of the former can be pointed out in a
single sentence while the latter is a very difficult problem with a need
for honest analysis.
There are many interesting anecdotes spread through the book concerning the experiences of lawyers young and old. The reviewer felt
that the book would have been far more entertaining and valuable had
there 'been more of these stories with reliance on the reader's intelligence to draw therefrom the lesson to be learned. In this manner the
"entertaining way" style of the author would be achieved and in the
process the didactic style would be de-emphasized.
Throughout the book are practical bits of advice, for example, the
need of some study of accountancy in pre-law -preparation, the danger
in splitting fees with a lay agency, etc. Thus, it is not without merit
and has some valuable information for the law student.
NATHANIEL GRAVES

Book Review Editor.

SIMS.

